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This study looks into the nature of two prominent Asian 
civil wars and the impacts they had on their respective 
economies.  Comparing the 1967-1979 Khmer Rouge genocides 
in Cambodia with the more recent 1983-2009 Sri Lankan war 
for Tamil independence, we look specifically at the impacts on 
infrastructure and land, the fiscal system, and the monetary and 
financial systems.  Evidence suggests that the Cambodian civil 
war fits the standard mould for internally worn-torn countries, 
while the relatively more isolated nature of the Sri Lankan 
conflict led to significantly different outcomes.  It is still too 
soon to compare the post-conflict impacts on the two nations, 
however. 
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1 Introduction and Brief 
Literature Review 
For any country, engaging in conflict comes with 
significant cost.  However, for countries engaged in domestic 
conflicts the costs are often particularly high (Collier, 1999).  
Violence and social upheaval drastically alter the lives of those 
living in afflicted areas and take their toll via a number of 
economic impacts.  This study looks at these economic impacts 
in two Asian countries – Cambodia and Sri Lanka.  These two 
countries make an interesting comparison because although they 
are in a similar part of the world they experienced distinctly 
different civil wars, as we shall discuss below.  This study will 
compare the experiences of each country and the similarities and 
differences between them and other civil wars more generally. 
The structure is as follows:  After a brief look at the existing 
literature on Cambodia and Sri Lanka the fundamental elements 
of the two conflicts are compared, and this is then set in a 
broader context with a discussion of the general consequences 
of civil war.  Given that this is an extensive topic, the focus then 
turns to just three key economic impacts in Cambodia and Sri 
Lanka: infrastructure and land, the fiscal system, and the 
monetary and financial systems. The conclusion is that 
fundamental differences in the conflicts themselves seem to 
explain the different economic impacts of the respective wars.   
The literature to date has taken a wide variety of approaches, 
from focussing on the timing and allocation of multilateral aid 
into these conflict zones (Ofstad, 2002) to looking at specific 
and varied impacts such as landmines (Harris, 2000) and tourist 
behaviour (Selvanathan, 2007). Amongst the varied literature, 
there has been some limited work specifically on the economic 
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impacts of the Cambodian (Irvin, 1993) and Sri Lankan (Grobar 
& Gnanaselvam, 1993; Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & Kelegama, 
2001) conflicts.  No studies have attempted to approximate the 
specific cost of the Cambodian war, but there have been four 
interesting attempts in the Sri Lankan case (the two papers 
above, as well as Marga, 1998; Richardson & Samarasinghe, 
1991).  The Cambodian experience has the benefit of hindsight 
– which is reflected in the number of post-conflict studies – 
while the Sri Lankan experience is still too recent to have a 
reasonable body of literature around post-conflict conditions.  
As with almost all conflict situations, reliable statistical 
information is somewhat difficult to come by (Collier, 1999), 
particularly for Cambodia. 
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2  A Comparison of the Conflicts 
In order to understand the different impacts of the 
Cambodian and Sri Lankan conflicts, it is necessary to first 
compare the conflicts themselves.  There are some similar 
elements.  Both were fuelled by ethnic tensions, and large-scale 
repression and killing of ethnic groups led actions in both 
conflicts to be considered genocide – although in Cambodia this 
was on a much larger scale.  Both conflicts were affected and 
(arguably) aggravated by international influence.  Indian 
influence in Sri Lanka and American, Chinese and Vietnamese 
influence in Cambodia led to increased fighting and tension 
(despite the presence of Indian troops for peacekeeping 
purposes).  In spite of these international influences, each war 
took place almost exclusively on domestic ground. 
In many respects, however, the two conflicts were very 
different. Firstly, although starting a number of years earlier, the 
Cambodian civil war was shorter – it is generally considered to 
have lasted for the twelve years between 1967 and 1979 
(Kiernan, 2002).1  In contrast, the Sri Lankan civil war, which 
began with the ambush of a government convoy by Tamil 
separatists in early 1983, lasted for twenty-six years.2   As 
Collier (1999) has argued, differences in the length of conflict 
can lead to very different experiences post-conflict.  The fact 
that Sri Lanka’s war was more than twice as long as Cambodia’s 
and has only recently reached some form of closure is likely to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Although	  civil	  unrest	  continued	  late	  into	  the	  1990s	  (Beresford	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  
2	  It	  is	  officially	  considered	  to	  have	  ended	  May	  2009,	  with	  the	  death	  of	  
Velupillai	  Prabhakaran	  (Times	  of	  India,	  2009).	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result in considerable differences in the economic legacies of the 
two conflicts.   
Secondly, the intensity of fighting was quite different.  In 
Cambodia the conflict was predominantly intense for the entire 
twelve years, while in Sri Lanka, where much of the fighting 
was confined to the northern and eastern areas, bursts of fighting 
and terrorism took place more sporadically (Arunatilake et al., 
2001).   
A third notable difference is that the conflict in Cambodia 
led to total government upheaval, with a military coup in 1970 
and the Khmer Rouge taking control of the government by force 
in 1975 before being overthrown by the Vietnamese in 1979.  
By contrast, the Sri Lankan conflict took place during a period 
of relatively stable democratic governance, although the control 
of the government in some areas of the country was limited and 
the governing party changed over the period. 
3 General Economic 
Consequences of Civil Conflict 
To put the experiences of Cambodia and Sri Lanka into 
context, a comparison can be made with civil war economies 
more generally.  A number of authors have examined the 
general economic impacts of internal conflict across a large 
cross section of countries – Collier being perhaps the most 
widely published3 – and there are a number of stylised facts that 
are apparent from these studies.  Starting with perhaps the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Collier’s	  has	  focused	  on	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  topics.	  	  For	  example,	  he	  also	  looks	  
at	  the	  economic	  causes	  of	  civil	  war	  (Collier,	  1998;2000)	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obvious overarching phenomenon; GDP, GDP per capita, and 
the associated growth rates almost always fall, relative to both 
an alternative no-conflict scenario and to pre-conflict levels 
(Arunatilake et al., 2001).  Some of the key general economic 
impacts that are not focussed on here include: sharp decreases in 
the overall health and education of the population; a large rise in 
human rights abuses; mass population displacement and 
demographic shifts; political instability and the onset or spread 
of corruption; and often a collapse of a country’s institutional 
systems (including government, the legal system and property 
rights) and industrial sector.  Trade typically declines, 
international relations fall apart, and around the end of the 
conflict aid flows increase.4 
What typically happens with regards to the three economic 
impacts that are the focus of this study?  Firstly, infrastructure 
tends to deteriorate in a number of ways, leaving a low level of 
infrastructure post conflict.  Both domestic and international 
productive investment declines sharply, maintenance of existing 
infrastructure is neglected and it is often directly damaged 
during the fighting (Haughton, 1998).  Productive land is 
generally left unproductive, riddled with landmines or other 
hazards (Harris, 2000).  Secondly, a country’s fiscal position 
usually declines as governments increase spending on war 
related endeavours (most notably the military), and as social 
upheaval and institutional breakdown make tax avoidance easier, 
narrowing the tax base (Haughton, 1998).  And thirdly, the 
country’s monetary and financial systems typically disintegrate.  
Because the tax base narrows, governments tend instead to print 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  ideal	  timing	  of	  aid	  is	  debated,	  but	  typically	  the	  bulk	  of	  aid	  flows	  are	  once	  
conflict	  ends	  (Ofstad,	  2002).	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money to finance high military expenditure and this leads to 
high levels of inflation, sometimes at magnitudes in excess of 
100%.5  Combined with a decline in the fiscal position, this 
usually leaves a country financially crippled at the end of an 
extended period of conflict.  As confidence in the monetary 
system declines, the financial system also falls apart.  Banking 
one’s assets becomes risky as the government’s ability to 
monitor and regulate lending is undermined and banks become 
insolvent, so people tend instead to keep their assets in more 
liquid forms (Azariadis & Stachurski, 2005).  This often means 
an increase in informal credit networks and holdings of foreign 
currency, which can be a difficult process to undo (Kiernan, 
2002).  These are the general observations, which we will now 
compare with the specific experiences of Cambodia and Sri 
Lanka. 
4 The Economic Consequences 
of Civil War in Cambodia and 
Sri Lanka 
4.1 Infrastructure and Land 
How did conflict affect each country’s infrastructure and 
land? Cambodia’s experience was perhaps more dramatic than 
Sri Lanka’s.  Massive infrastructure losses occurred around the 
country, particularly in the urban centres where the Khmer 
Rouge evacuated and relocated entire populations and near the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Haughton	  (1998),	  p.37.	  	  This	  effectively	  taxes	  those	  who	  are	  in	  possession	  of	  
domestic	  currency.	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Vietnamese border where the United States undertook a 
systematic aerial bombing campaign as part of the war in 
Vietnam (Kiernan, 2002).  The infrastructure losses were 
exacerbated when the post-conflict government was isolated by 
the international community from significant aid and investment 
flows that would have helped in reconstruction, during a time 
when there was significant FDI flows into other developing 
Asian countries (Irvin, 1993). While modern industry was 
largely destroyed, basic agricultural production survived due to 
the regime’s focus on relocating urban centres and the exclusion 
of certain agriculture-oriented primary schools from closure (De 
Walque, 2004). However, significant areas of productive land 
were lost in the widespread distribution of landmines 6  and 
property was neglected as private ownership was banned (Ear, 
1995). 
In Sri Lanka, the direct destruction of infrastructure such as 
roads and buildings was much less widespread.  Although not 
entirely isolated, infrastructure was destroyed primarily in areas 
where the fighting was most intense – to the north and east of 
the country (Selvanathan, 2007).  Infrastructure suffered largely 
as a result of a sharp decline in government investment, as well 
as a decline in both domestic and international private 
investment – with total investment falling from 30.8% of GDP 
in 1982 to 22.8% of GDP in 1988 (Grobar & Gnanaselvam, 
1993).  This is significant but probably far less than the decline 
in Cambodia, where at one stage even money itself was banned.  
However, as the conflict continued and the government 
introduced a number of economic reform programmes, FDI into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Harris	  (2000),	  p.219.	  	  Estimates	  of	  landmines	  in	  Cambodia	  are	  around	  4-­‐6	  
million.	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Sri Lanka recovered and by 2003 it had reached its highest level 
(Chandrakumara & Budhway, 2005).  Approximately 45% of 
the (now significant) aid flows into Sri Lanka are invested into 
economic infrastructure (Goodhand & Klem, 2005).  
Nevertheless, much productive cultivatable land has been lost in 
the fighting, and there are large numbers of landmines, 
particularly in areas such as the Jaffna Peninsular (Arunatilake 
et al., 2001). 
The destruction of production inputs from the Cambodian 
conflict seems to have been proportionally greater than that of 
the Sri Lankan conflict.  One explanation for this may be found 
in the differences between the fundamental purposes of the 
insurgent factions.  The Khmer Rouge made it their aim to 
destroy the old society – including its various forms of 
infrastructure – which they achieved to a large degree (Clayton, 
1998).  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), however, 
were fighting not for the destruction of Sri Lankan society, but 
for its separation into two sovereign states.  Their warfare was 
therefore aimed at strategic government and civilian targets, and 
in areas under their control they often coexisted with the 
established infrastructure, albeit exploitatively.   
Another explanation for this difference may be found in the 
nature of international involvement.  While the presence of the 
Indian army in Sri Lanka was for the purposes of peacekeeping 
– even though it aggravated anti-Indian terrorist groups – the 
involvement of other nations in Cambodia largely promoted the 
destruction of infrastructure.  Thailand provided refuge for the 
insurgents across their borders while the Chinese financed them, 
the Vietnamese forcefully invaded, and the United States 
bombing brought widespread destruction.  Also, an 
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improvement in international investment occurred in Sri Lanka 
during the conflict (Chandrakumara & Budhway, 2005), while it 
virtually ceased during Cambodia’s.  The Cambodian 
experience is more familiar to the general experience – whereby 
civil war leads to comprehensive damage to a country’s 
infrastructure.  The Sri Lankan experience demonstrates that the 
partial isolation of civil conflict to certain areas may allow a 
large portion of the country’s infrastructure and land to avoid 
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4.2 The Fiscal system 
What impact did the conflicts have on each country’s fiscal 
system?  The Cambodian conflict began in a context of financial 
difficulty – the Sihanouk regime had been bankrupted during the 
mid-1960s, when rice smuggling undermined the government’s 
main source of revenue, export duties (Kiernan, 2002).  The 
fiscal situation continued to decline, as the Khmer Rouge 
massacres targeted many of the trained urban workers – teachers, 
engineers, doctors – that constituted a large part of the country’s 
tax base (Clayton, 1998).  This took place on an incredibly large 
scale, with the death toll estimated at over 12% of the entire 
population (Haughton, 1998).  At the end of the conflict the new 
government struggled with numerous fiscal problems including 
an estimated budget deficit of at least 5% of GDP, tax revenue 
down to below 15% of GDP, and foreign debt up to over 100% 
of GDP (Haughton, 1998).  Conflicts of interest between the 
post-war government and the Khmer Rouge opposition 
controlling Cambodia’s UN seat meant all international aid was 
cut off in 1982. More than fifteen years after the conflict ended, 
Cambodia still had a substantial government deficit (Irvin, 
1993). 
In Sri Lanka, the commencement of fighting prompted the 
government to increase military spending from just over 1% to 
over 6% of GDP (Arunatilake, 2001).  This was partly offset by 
large decreases in spending on economic services, housing, and 
investment by the government, but was also funded by an 
increase in the country’s foreign debt (Grobar & Gnanaselvam, 
1993).  Interestingly, spending on health, education and welfare 
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has been much more stable – a vastly different experience to 
that of Cambodia.  Ofstad (2002) argues that the Sri Lankan 
experience was different to that of most countries engaged in 
civil conflict as the government managed to fund the war 
somewhat successfully, although this stability began to decline 
in later years.  A special defence levy, combined with other 
government revenues, provided almost all of the necessary 
finance.  Increasing flows of financial aid also helped appease 
the government’s deficit. 
So the detrimental fiscal impacts of the conflict were 
significantly worse in the Cambodian case, and again this seems 
to reflect differences in the fundamental nature of the conflicts.  
The Sri Lankan government benefited from consistent revenues 
from a relatively large and stable tax base, while the Cambodian 
tax base shrank drastically.  International aid flowed to a more 
stable Sri Lankan government, while international transfers of 
money into Cambodia primarily supported the unstable Khmer 
Rouge regime (although not in the form of official aid).  
Military spending increased sharply at the onset of the Sri 
Lankan civil war, yet at 6% of GDP (plus the significantly lower 
costs absorbed by the LTTE and other rebellious factions)7 the 
total direct and indirect spending was never as high as the 
military spending in Cambodia.  Although precise statistics are 
not available, it seems that by the time the Khmer Rouge had 
taken power a large part of the country’s efforts had been shifted 
into some form of war-related endeavour.  Again, the experience 
of Cambodia is more in line with the general experiences of 
internally warring countries while the fiscal stability of Sri 
Lanka in the earlier years of the conflict is unusual, and seems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Arunatilake	  et	  al	  (2001),	  p.1489,	  provides	  an	  estimate	  of	  this	  amount.	  
The Economic Consequences of Civil War in Asia: A comparison of 
Sri Lanka and Cambodia	   90	  
	   	  
to stem from the relatively stable and strong control that the 
central government maintained over much of the country.   
4.3 The Monetary and Financial 
systems 
How did each of the conflicts impact the countries’ 
monetary and financial systems; particularly currency and the 
banking sector?  In Cambodia, a consequence of the fighting 
was the fundamental destruction of the monetary system – based 
on the Cambodian riel – altogether.  As the Khmer Rouge 
assumed control of the country they destroyed the central bank 
of Phnom Penn and abolished the use of money (Clayton, 1998).  
This didn’t prevent the country from experiencing significant 
monetary problems after the conflict and, once the use of 
currency had been re-established, accelerating inflation occurred 
as the government printed money to finance the deficit caused 
by its reconstruction programme.  This inflation was not 
successfully controlled for some time, and attempts to do so 
came at great economic cost as important government spending 
was cut back (Irvin, 1993).  Obviously, with the deconstruction 
of the monetary system, the financial sector also collapsed.  The 
Cambodian economy instead turned to unofficial channels of 
lending and borrowing, and this reliance on the informal credit 
market has been difficult to undo post-conflict, partly because it 
requires a confidence in the new financial sector that has taken a 
while to materialise (Beresford et al., 2004).  With ongoing 
inflation undermining real interest rates and widespread 
dollarization, the monetary system, exchange rate policy, and 
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banking sector in Cambodia have continued to struggle (Irvin, 
1993). 
Because Sri Lanka didn’t initially finance the war by 
printing money, inflation was stable and low for the first few 
years of the conflict.  However, as the war drew on and external 
debt began to rise, monetisation of deficits meant that after 1987 
inflation started to rise.  By 1990 it was over 20% per annum 
(Grobar & Gnanaselvam, 1993).  With the end of the fighting 
such a recent event it is difficult to make accurate statements 
about inflation figures in Sri Lanka post-conflict, but the 
government has taken steps to address rising inflation. Despite 
the fighting, the government developed policies and introduced 
reforms to rein in the debt and reduce monetisation.8  Because 
the country’s infrastructure has largely remained intact there is 
still a functioning financial sector and strong central bank.  A 
consequence of the retention of a relatively strong monetary 
system based around the rupee is that the Sri Lankan population 
has not transferred large parts of its assets into foreign currency. 
Again, there are significant differences in the experiences 
of the monetary and financial systems in Cambodia and Sri 
Lanka.  Cambodia’s monetary system – including the central 
bank, financial sector, and means of exchange – was destroyed 
in the course of the fighting, while Sri Lanka’s remained intact 
despite significant impediments generated by the conflict.  
Foreign currency was largely the preferred means of exchange 
in post-conflict Cambodia (primarily US dollars), while in Sri 
Lanka the rupee has remained the currency of choice.  One 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  document	  containing	  these	  policies	  is	  Regaining	  Sri	  Lanka	  (2002),	  see	  
Ghosh	  et	  al.	  (2008).	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similarity is that a legacy of inflation was left to both economies 
after the cessation of fighting, as both governments monetised 
large budget deficits.  However, this was far worse in Cambodia 
and while the legacy of inflation is common to civil conflicts 
more generally, the collapse of the monetary and financial 
system in Cambodia is more analogous to the general case than 
Sri Lanka’s relative stability.  Again, it would seem that the 
restricted scope of the Sri Lankan civil war led to a more 
positive economic outcome. 
4.4 Impacts on GDP per capita 
These destructive economic impacts translate into 
significant changes in living standards within the countries 
involved.  One reasonable proxy for this change in living 
standards is GDP per capita, which almost always decreases as a 
result of prolonged civil war (Collier, 1999).  The Cambodian 
experience certainly matches this stylised fact.  From 1970 to 
1975 Cambodian real GDP fell from $1086 to $693 (2005 US 
dollars) per capita.  The decline in income levels wasn’t 
reversed until 1987, by which time per capita real GDP had 
fallen to $347 – 32% of its 1970 level (Penn World Tables, 
2009).  This can be seen as a combined result of the impacts 
discussed here and the other consequences of the Cambodian 
civil war, since most similar countries were experiencing real 
GDP growth over this time.  In contrast to this, the Sri Lankan 
civil war accompanied a continued period of domestic growth in 
real GDP per capita.  Over the 20 years for which comparable 
data is available – from 1983 to 2003 – it increased at a 
consistent rate from $2081 to $4272 – a 105% increase (Penn 
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World Tables, 2009).  So although civil war in Cambodia led to 
a drastic decrease in income levels through the impacts 
discussed above, this was not the case in Sri Lanka.  This is not 
to say that the war in Sri Lanka had a positive, or even neutral, 
impact on income levels – in fact a number of studies such as 
Arunatilake et al (2001) have estimated that GDP would have 
been significantly higher had there been peace – but, despite the 
conflict, growth in incomes still occurred.  The income 
distribution in Cambodia was significantly affected by the war 
and the urban-focussed reconstruction efforts (Beresford et al, 
2004), but it is too soon to make a useful comparison with the 
Sri Lankan post-conflict income distribution. 
5 Summary and Conclusions 
Having discussed three of the major impacts of the civil 
wars in Cambodia and Sri Lanka and compared these to the 
experiences of civil war-torn countries more generally, what can 
we conclude?  It seems that although there were some 
comparable aspects to these two conflicts, fundamental 
differences in the length and intensity of upheaval and 
governmental stability led to very different economic 
experiences.   The Cambodian experience largely seems to 
conform to the general case, with the country undergoing 
massive and widespread infrastructure damage, pervasive fiscal 
problems, and a collapse of the monetary and financial systems.  
In fact, the Cambodian case seems to be an extreme example of 
the typical country engaged in civil war.  In contrast, the Sri 
Lankan experience does not conform to the general case very 
well at all.  Infrastructure damage was limited, fiscal problems 
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were kept under control for much of the fighting, and the 
monetary system remained relatively stable for many years.   
The explanation for these major differences seems to lie in 
the nature of the conflicts themselves.  While both were ethnic, 
genocidal and internationally influenced, the Cambodian 
conflict was much more countrywide and consistently intense 
than the Sri Lankan conflict.  Important to the impacts discussed 
here was that the government in Cambodia experienced massive 
upheaval and struggled to maintain stability post-conflict 
(Beresford et al 2004).  In Sri Lanka, however, the government 
remained relatively stable and in control of most of the country.  
The “internal conflict … put a heavy burden on the government” 
(Ghosh et al, 2008, p.82) on Sri Lanka, but this burden did not 
lead to the same degree of economic change as in Cambodia.   
The different experiences of these two countries are an 
indication that the nature of civil conflict has important 
implications for the specific legacies that a post-conflict society 
will have to deal with.  While this seems an obvious and 
straightforward conclusion, it highlights the notion that the 
experience of civil war does not necessarily lead to a standard 
outcome.  The economic impacts of domestic conflict appear to 
be at least partly determined by the fundamental nature of the 
conflicts themselves.  
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